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Usually copyright law protects a fictional character within the
context of the work in which the character appears. In these cases,
infringement is found if the alleged infringer had access to the
copyrighted work and there is substantial similarity between the
copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work.1 Access is easy to
*
Ms. Zecevic graduated from the University of Connecticut School of Law in May
of 2005. She would like to thank Professor Kurlantzick for a very interesting copyright
class and his thoughtful input and help with this article.
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prove if the original work is widely available to the public.
Substantial similarity, however, is much more difficult to determine.
One limiting principle is that copyright protection extends only to the
2
expression of an idea and not to the idea itself.
In determining whether there is substantial similarity between
the expression of ideas in two different works, courts have sometimes
used the "extrinsic" test, where the plot, characters, setting, dialogue
and other details of the two works are compared. 3 Other courts have
turned to a more "intrinsic" test, where "[tihe two works involved ...
[are] considered and tested, not hypercritically or with meticulous
scrutiny, but by the observations and impressions of the average
reasonable reader and spectator." 4 Another test, articulated by Judge
Hand, is the "abstraction test," where details of a work are gradually
left out so that the work becomes more and more general. 5 At some
point the work is so general that to protect it would translate into
6
protecting the copyright owner's ideas rather than his expression.
As is evident by the number of different tests used, it is often
difficult to determine if an allegedly infringing work has taken enough
of the expression of the original to satisfy the "substantially similar"
standard of copyright infringement.
The problem is further
complicated when we consider whether literary characters deserve
separate and independent protection.
The issue of separate protection for literary characters arises
when the character is removed from the original work, so that the
character leads a new and independent life in a separately written
piece. Characters that are capable of leading independent lives are
those who are especially memorable, such that they stay in a reader's
imagination long after the original storyline is forgotten. An author
seeking to write a new adventure for Superman, Tarzan, or Sherlock
Holmes, must be aware of the legal considerations involved. When the
character is separated from his original copyrighted work, the
determination of the legal protection to which the character itself is
entitled is difficult to determine.

1.
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
2.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 10203 (1879).
3.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir.
1944).
4.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).

6.

Id.
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A few years ago the topic of character protection arose when
the estate of Vladimir Nabakov sued Pia Pera, the author of Lo's
Diary, for copyright infringement. 7 Lo's Diary makes extensive use of
Lolita and Humbert, the main characters of Nabakov's 1955
copyrighted novel, Lolita.8
Unlike Lolita, which is told from
Humbert's point of view, Lo's Diary tells the story from Lolita's point
of view. 9 The parties ultimately settled, 10 presumably in part because
of the uncertainty regarding protection of literary characters.
However, Lo's Diary is not the only work where authors have
borrowed characters from other novels. For instance, a novel by
Valerie Martin retells the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde from the
point of view of Mary Reilly, the doctor's maid." Another example is
Tom Stoppard's use of two minor characters from Shakespeare's
Hamlet in the play Rosencrantz and Guildensternare Dead.'2 Finally,
a novel, Wide Sargasso Sea, was written about Mrs. Rochester, the
mysterious crazed first wife from the novel Jane Eyre.13
On one hand, characters could be copyrighted separately so
that the same character or a substantially similar character could not
appear in a new work without the author's permission. This approach
would clearly limit the building blocks, or raw material, that other
authors have to work with in a way that would likely hinder
creativity. On the other hand, characters could be denied copyright
protection altogether, such that the copyright in the original work
would not extend to the characters. In this case, an author could labor
for months developing a memorable character that would bring joy to
generations of readers, only to have that character copied and placed
in any story the copier pleases. Such treatment may prove to offer too
little incentive for original authors to exert the effort needed to create
extraordinary characters.
It is clear that there is a need to strike a balance between
giving authors enough incentive to create remarkable characters and
leaving enough raw materials in the public domain upon which
authors can build.
Courts have tried to formulate tests for
7.

Ralph Blumenthal, Nabokov Son Files Suit To Block a Retold "Lolita"N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at B9.

8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
David D. Kirkpatrick, Court Halts Book Based on 'Gone With the Wind', N.Y.

TIMES, April 21, 2001, at Al.
11.
See Valerie MARTIN, MARY REILLY (Doubleday 1990).
12.
See TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (Grove Press
1967).
13.
See JEAN RHys, WIDE SARGASSO SEA (Norton 1966).
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determining when a character deserves independent copyright
protection that keep in mind the need for balancing, but much
uncertainty still exists regarding the protection of literary characters.
Part I of this paper discusses the characteristics that make
literary characters especially difficult to protect. Part II describes the
historical treatment of literary characters and the two main tests used
to determine whether they are entitled to independent copyright
protection. Part III demonstrates that the two tests currently used
are not adequate tools for determining when copyright law protects
literary characters.
Part IV explores the possibility of using
trademark and unfair competition laws to offer partial protection to
fictional characters. Part V presents an argument that literary
characters do not need independent protection because they are
already sufficiently protected by the copyright in the original work
when supplemented by the protection offered by trademark and unfair
competition laws. Part V also argues that the tests created for
determining when fictional characters are protected adds nothing of
value that is not already found in the substantial similarity test.
I. WHY ARE LITERARY CHARACTERS SO DIFFICULT TO PROTECT?

Literary characters are especially hard to protect because they
have a "tangible existence only in the specific words, pictures, and
sounds created by [their] author." 14
Each reader uses these
descriptions to come up with their own mental image of the
character. 15 Different readers interpret the author's description of a
character in unique ways; they fill in the gaps left by the author and
make judgments and presumptions about the character using their
own individual sets of values. "An independent character, therefore, is
difficult to define or grasp clearly, since no two minds will conceive of
it in precisely the same way."16
Defining a particular character is also difficult because authors
- or good authors, at least - do not simply list all of the characteristics

of their fictional characters at the beginning of a work. A character
develops throughout the book, through its interactions with others, as
well as through its accomplishments, failures and reactions to difficult
situations. Because descriptions of characters are often scattered

14.
Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis.
L. REV. 429, 430 (1986).

15.
16.

Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 431.
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throughout a work and continuously change and build, a character's
complete identity can be very difficult to grasp and clearly define.
Determining whether a literary character is independently
entitled to copyright protection poses a more difficult problem than
determining whether a literary work as a whole should receive such
protection. While neither determination is easy, at least an entire
literary work has distinct and definable elements, such as a
beginning, middle and end, which can be compared to another work.
Furthermore, an entire work has a plot that follows a specific
sequence, a set of characters, a setting, and a mood-all elements that
can be compared. The description of a character, on the other hand, is
scattered throughout the book and the mental image of the character
continuously changes and develops within the reader's mind as the
story unfolds. As a result, when comparing two characters to see if
one substantially infringes another, it is difficult to articulate exactly
what is entitled to copyright protection. When one cannot clearly
define or limit a character, a comparison of that character with a
potentially infringing one is especially difficult.
In constrast, graphically depicted characters do not suffer from
the same elusiveness as non-graphically depicted literary characters
and have therefore received different treatment. In a long line of
cases, courts found that cartoon characters are protected by copyright
even when elements of plot are not copied. 17 Graphic characters are
not treated differently because they are more deserving of protection,
but rather because "it is far simpler to make visual comparisons than
8
to compare abstractions.'

II.

HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF LITERARY CHARACTERS

Despite the difficulty inherent in establishing independent
legal protection for literary characters, courts have articulated two
main tests for determining when a character deserves independent
copyright protection.
The first test was termed the "distinctly
delineated" test and the second test has been referred to as the "story
being told" test.19

17.
See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983);
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir.1982); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978).
18.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 451.
19.
Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir.
1954) (discussing analysis in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930)).
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The possibility of protecting literary characters seemingly
originated in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.20 The plaintiff in
that case was the author of the play Abie's Irish Rose, which is about a
Jewish boy marrying an Irish-Catholic girl. 21 The play follows the
conflict which the couples' union causes within their religious families,
but ultimately has a happy ending. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's motion picture The Cohens and the Kelleys infringed upon
her play. 22 The defendant's movie is about a Jewish girl and an IrishCatholic man who marry and the trouble that their marriage causes
within their families. 23 The movie also ends happily with the families
24
reconciling.
In the course of his decision, Judge Hand mentioned the
possibility that characters could be protected "independently of the
'plot"' even though such a case had not previously arisen. 25 He
explained that:
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might so
closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough
that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the
discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of
his mistress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play, as
little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or Darwin's theory of
the Origin of Species. It follows that the less developed the characters, the less
they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them
26
too indistinctly.

This analysis by Judge Hand gave rise to the "distinctly delineated"
test.
The "distinctly delineated" test rests on the principle that the
more developed a character is, the more it embodies protectable
expression and less a general idea.2 7 Courts since Nichols have
developed a two-part test from Judge Hand's discussion, which has
become the standard employed in character infringement cases. 28 The
first question under the test is "whether the character was created

20.
21.

45 F.2d 119.
Id. at 120.

22.
23.

Id.
Id.

24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 121.

26.

Id.

27.

See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12

(Matthew Bender & Co. ed. 2004) [hereinafter NIMMER].
28.
See id.; Gregory S. Schienke, The Spawn of Learned Hand - A Reexamination of
Copyright Protection and Fictional Characters:How Distinctly Delineated Must the Story
Be Told?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 63, 68-69 (2005).
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with enough delineation to afford copyright protection." 29 Only if the
character is sufficiently developed so that it constitutes more than just
an idea, and therefore is worthy of copyright protection, should one
move on to the next step. The second question is whether "the alleged
infringer cop[ied] such development and not merely a broader and
more abstract outline." 30 To establish an infringement there must be
actual copying of expression rather than copying of ideas or using a
31
general type of character.
The Ninth Circuit formulated the second major standard for
determining whether characters deserve independent copyright
protection in Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System. 32 In that case an author, Hammett, composed a mystery
detective story called The Maltese Falcon, whose main character was a
detective named Sam Spade. 33
Hammett then granted Warner
Brothers exclusive rights to use The Maltese Falcon story in movies,
radio and television. 34 Hammett later used Sam Spade as the main
character in new stories, and Warner Brothers complained that it had
35
acquired the exclusive right to use the writing, The Maltese Falcon.
Warner Brothers argued that the license included the individual
characters, their names and the title. 36 Hammett argued that the
exclusive use of the characters and their names was not granted in the
37
license, and that he could therefore use them in subsequent stories.
The Court held that Hammett did not grant the rights to the
characters in the license to Warner Brothers and that Hammett could
use the Sam Spade character in subsequent stories.38 The Court
explained that the argument set forth by Warner Brothers was
"unreasonable, and would effect the very opposite of the statute's
purpose which is to encourage the production of the arts."39 The Court
went on to reason, however, that "[i]t is conceivable that the character

29.
Mathew A. Kaplan, Note, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, But Are
They Copyrightable?: Protection of Literary CharactersWith Respect To Secondary Works,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 817, 823 (1999); see also NIMMER, supra note 27, §2.12.
30.
NIMMER, supra note 27, §2.12.
31.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954) (footnotes omitted) ("protection is
given only to the expression of the idea - not the idea itself').
32.
216 F.2d 945 (1954).
33.
Id. at 948.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 948.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 949.
39.
Id. at 950.
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really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only the
chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of
the protection afforded by the copyright." 40 The Court concluded that
even if Hammett had assigned the complete rights to Warner Brothers
he could still use his characters in subsequent stories because "[t]he
characters were vehicles for the story told, and the vehicles did not go
41
with the sale of the story."
This test, which became known as the "story being told" test,
greatly narrowed the protection available for literary characters. 42 In
fact, the standard excluded "virtually any character from copyright
protection, because it 'seems to envisage a story devoid of plot wherein
character study constitutes all, or substantially all, of the work.' "43
The standard has been criticized and many courts have declined to use
it, distorted its meaning to avoid its consequences, or ignored it and
applied the Nichols test instead. 44 Despite this stringent standard,
courts have found certain characters, such as Rocky and James Bond,
to constitute the "story being told."45 In both these cases, however, the
46
court also included an analysis under the "distinctly delineated" test.
If the two main standards used to determine when literary
characters are entitled to copyright protection seem vague and
confusing, that is because they are. The following section outlines
some of the problems with both the "distinctly delineated" and the
"story being told" standard.

III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE "DISTINCTLY DELINEATED" AND "STORY
BEING TOLD" TESTS IN DECIDING WHICH CHARACTERS TO PROTECT

The "distinctly delineated" standard is difficult to apply for
three main reasons: the test is vague and asks judges to assume the
role of literary critic; judges often apply it incorrectly, which leads to
overprotection; and it does not necessarily protect the most developed
characters. 47 The "distinctly delineated" test clarifies that more40.

Id.

41.
43.

Id.
NIMMER, supra note 27, §2.12.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 455 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 27, §2.12).

44.

Id.

42.

45.
See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDK, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109, at
*20-23 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
46.
See MGM, 900 F. Supp. at 1296; Anderson, No. 87-0592 WDK, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11109, at *20-23 .
47.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 457-59.
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developed characters deserve more protection. 48 However, beyond this
notion, the test does not provide much guidance. Courts have not
explained what exactly makes a character "distinctly delineated"
enough to warrant protection. Judges are left to act as literary critics
and decide on their own which fictional characters deserve protection
and which lack sufficient development. As one commentator has
noted, "[w]hat makes a fictional character worthy of protection seems
49
to require Justice Stewart's 'I know it when I see it' test."
The problem with trying to clearly articulate the reasons why a
certain character is considered "distinctly delineated" is demonstrated
in Burroughs v.Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.50 The court there held
that the character "Tarzan" was distinctly delineated and sufficiently
developed so as to be copyrightable. 51 The court's description of
Tarzan, however, does not actually convey what makes the character
sufficiently developed or distinctly delineated. The court's description
was as follows: "Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely in
tune with his jungle environment, able to communicate with animals
yet able to experience human emotions. He is athletic, innocent,
youthful, gentle and strong. He is Tarzan."52 The problem with this
description is that it seems like more of a general character type,
which can apply equally as well to other literary characters, such as
53
Kipling's "Mowgli" from The Jungle Book.
The Burroughs case demonstrates that a comparison of two
works would offer a more convincing and less arbitrary argument for
why "Tarzan" should be protected. However, the judge in that case
had no other characters with which to compare "Tarzan."
Unfortunately, the issue in that case was not infringement, but
whether a grant of the right to use the character arose under
copyright. 54 In order to determine whether a grant of a nonexclusive
license to use the "Tarzan" character was a right under copyright, and
therefore subject to the termination provisions of the Copyright Act,
the court had to determine whether "Tarzan" was "sufficiently
55
delineated to be copyrightable."

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See NIMMER, supra note 27, §2.12.
Schienke, supra note 28, at 80.
519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id.; see Kurtz, supra note 14, at 458.
Burroughs, 519 F.Supp. at 391.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 458 n.167.
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The Burroughs case is still illustrative of the difficulty in trying
to determine whether or not a character is sufficiently developed. As
one commentator has noted, "[a]ttempting to determine the extent of a
character's development, without making comparisons, leads to
abstract and fruitless speculation." 56 Inevitably, a description of a
character used to demonstrate why that character is distinctly
delineated ends up reading like a description of a general type and
"covers the pattern of many characters." 57 The presence of these
inherent problems with attempting to designate a character "distinctly
delineated" or "well developed" leads to the conclusion that this test is
not helpful or proper for determining when literary characters deserve
independent protection.
Perhaps, because of the lack of guidance, courts have begun
overprotecting characters by considering only whether they are
copyrightable, and not whether there has been actual infringement.
By considering whether a character is sufficiently delineated to
receive copyright protection, and then automatically finding
infringement without comparing the two works to determine whether
one is substantially similar to the other, these courts seem to
concentrate exclusively on the first part of the Nichols test. For
instance, in another case involving "Tarzan," the court found that
defendant's adult movie entitled Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta
infringed upon the plaintiffs literary work. 58 The court began by
explaining that the characters were distinctly delineated, but then
automatically, without further analysis, found the defendant's
59
characters to be substantially similar, and therefore infringing.
Another example of a court concentrating solely on the
copyrightability of a character is the "Hopalong Cassidy" case.6 0 The
"Cassidy" character portrayed in the book was tough, confrontational,
and prone to violence, cursing, and tobacco-chewing. 61 The "Cassidy"
character in the movie, however, was more of a cleaned up version,
appearing kind and sentimental and without the cursing. 62 Despite
this lack of similarity between the two characters, the court held that

Id. at 463-64.
56.
57.
Id. at 464.
Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, No. 76-3612, 1976 U.S. Dist.
58.
LEXIS 11754, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1976).
59.
Id. at 9-10.
Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
60.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 459 (describing expert witness testimony as to a
61.
description of the book version of Cassidy).

62.

Id.
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the "Hopalong Cassidy" character in the book was distinctly
delineated, and that the use of the character would be copyright
infringement "irrespective and independent of the similarity of the
story line." 63 The court further held that the "Cassidy" character in the
motion picture was "substantially similar to the character 'Hopalong
Cassidy' in the books, and [that] both characters exhibit the same
basic traits. '64 As one commentator noted, the movie "Cassidy" and
the book "Cassidy" shared little similarity beyond their name and
cowboy background, but Judge Werker got around this lack of
similarity and "simply described the movie Cassidy as Mulford's
Cassidy 'turned inside out.'"65
These cases demonstrate that courts in an infringement action
sometimes determine only whether a character is copyrightable or
distinctly developed without also comparing the original and allegedly
infringing characters. One author described this truncated analysis
as courts using "the 'magically expedient' phrase of 'well developed' to
arrive [at and] solidify their reasoning." 66 The magic words "well
developed" or "distinctly delineated," however, do not tell us anything
about whether the two characters are substantially similar, or
whether enough of the original was taken to constitute copyright
infringement.
Apart from being employed in a way that is susceptible to
overprotection of characters, the "distinctly delineated" test is also
flawed because it does not necessarily offer protection for the most
developed characters. In fact, "[t]he most well-rounded characters,
those that are the most fully human, may be the most inextricably
bound to their context."6 7 For instance, it is questionable whether a
reader would be able to recognize the character of Raskolnikov in a
new story, despite the fact that Crime and Punishment centers on the
character's internal conflict, thoughts, and feelings of alienation and
self loathing to a degree that makes Raskolnikov seem very real.6 8
Instead, the "flatter character," the one that does not change through

63.
Filmvideo, 509 F. Supp. at 66.
64.
Id. at 64.
Francis Nevins, Copyright + Character = Catastrophe, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
65.
U.S.A. 303, 313 (1992).
66.
Schienke, supra note 28, at 81.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 464.
67.
68.

See

ETIENNE

BENSON

&

WENDY

CHENG,

SPARKNOTE

PUNISHMENT, http://www.sparknotes.com/lit/crime/characters.html
2006).

ON

CRIME

AND

(last visited Mar. 21,
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experiences but is always consistent, is the character that is the most
69
recognizable when removed from the original work.
An example of a "flatter character" that receives copyright
protection is Sherlock Holmes. Sherlock Holmes has been described
as a very limited and predictable character, to the extent that he is
almost formulaic. 70
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, the author of the
Sherlock Holmes novels, had grown tired of Holmes "because his
character admits of no light or shade." 71 However, Sherlock Holmes is
one of those characters that is considered well-developed and thus
deserving of copyright protection. 72 As Kurtz pointed out, "[a] more
rounded character, however, is remembered in connection with the
scenes 'through which she passed and as modified by these scenes that is to say, we do not remember her so easily because she waxes
and wanes and has facets like a human being.' 73
Because determining which characters are developed enough to
deserve protection is so difficult, a test allowing judges to reach
decisions based on the magic words "well developed" does not seem to
be a desirable solution. As one commentator pointed out, "[t]here is no
reason to credit judges with the ability to function as literary or
artistic critics of last resort." 74 Although the "distinctively delineated"
test was initially developed to include a comparison of the original
character and the potentially infringing one in order to determine
whether they are substantially similar, courts in general have
selectively ignored this second part of the Nichols test.
All of the criticisms of the "distinctly delineated" test apply
equally well to the "story being told" test. The "story being told" test
offers a distinction between a character that "constitutes the story
being told" and one that is "only the chessman in the game of telling
the story . . .... 75 However, according to one scholar, "[w]hat this
distinction is supposed to mean, how any court could conceivably use
it to divide protected from unprotected characters, and what gives a
federal judge the aesthetic credentials to draw this line, are matters
69.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 464.
70.
Id. at 465.
71.
Id. (quoting Conan Doyle, Sidelights on Sherlock Holmes, in THE BAKER
STREET READER 12, 14 (Philip A. Shreffler ed., 1984)).

72.

Id.

73.
Id. at 465 (quoting Doyle, supra note 71, at 106). "A round character is capable
of surprising in a convincing way. If it never surprises, it is flat. If it does not convince, it
is a flat pretending to be round." Id. (quoting Doyle, supra note 71, at 118).
74.
Id. at 438.
75.
See Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th
Cir. 1954).
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on which Judge Stephens maintains a sphinxlike silence." 76 The
result is that the test is applied inconsistently, not at all, or in
combination with the "distinctly delineated" test. 77 However when the
test is applied, the results are unpredictable and confusing.
IV. TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

As explained above, the tests for determining protection of
literary characters under copyright law are confusing, difficult to
apply, and often yield unpredictable results. The difficult application
of the "distinctly delineated" and "story being told" tests has led legal
scholars to examine alternate grounds for offering protection to
Trademark and unfair competition are the
literary characters.
For
primary alternatives to copyright suggested by scholars.7 8
instance, Gerald Jagorda has pointed out, "[w]here the concept of
copyright is intended to protect the creative expression existing within
a character, trademark and unfair competition laws are concerned
with a character's capacity to symbolize a particular source of goods or
services." 7 9 The critical issue under both state unfair competition laws
and the federal trademark laws is whether the alleged infringer's use
Unfair
of a character is "likely to cause public confusion."80
competition encompasses the narrower law of trademark,8 1 which
protects against "any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact" that is
"likely to "cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the

Nevins, supra note 65, at 315.
76.
77.
See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990) (court not considering the
"story being told" test in this character infringement case); Anderson v. Stallone, No. 870592 WDK, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109 (C.D. Calif. Apr. 25, 1989) (noting that the
distinctly delineated test is "simple in theory but elusive in application" and that the Ninth
Circuit has cast doubt on the reasoning of the "story being told" test, deciding in the end to
apply both tests because of the unsettled state of the law); see also David B. Feldman,
Finding a Home for Fictional Characters:A Proposalfor Change in Copyright Protection,
78 CAL. L. REV. 687, 691 (1990) (explaining that the test was never widely accepted or
used).
Kenneth E. Spahn, The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters, 9 U. MIAMI
78.
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 331, 342 (1992).

79.
Gerald Jagorda, The Mouse That Roars: Character Protection Strategies of
Disney and Others, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 235, 243 (1999).
80.
Leslie A. Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor: When Characters Outlive Their
Copyrights, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 437, 442 (1994).
81.
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
COMPETITION, § 2.02 (3d ed. 1994).

MCCARTHY

ON

TRADEMARKS

AND

UNFAIR
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affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin .... ,,82
Two questions must be answered to determine if infringement
under trademark law and unfair competition has taken place.8 3 The
first is whether the character has achieved "secondary meaning" or in
other words, whether "the public associate[s] the character's name
with the particular product being sold."8 4 The second question is
whether there is a likelihood of confusion or whether "the use of the
character's name by another [is] likely to deceive and confuse the
85
public as to the source of the goods."
There are several advantages to trademark and unfair
competition protection over copyright protection for literary
characters. First, trademark and unfair competition offer protection
of the name, appearance, costumes, and key phrases of a character; all
things left unprotected by copyright.8 6 Another significant advantage
is that "[tlhe fact that a copyrightable character or design has fallen
into the public domain [does] not preclude protection under the
trademark laws so long as it is shown to have acquired independent
trademark significance ....
."87
Therefore, trademark and unfair
competition protection may extend well beyond the copyright term, as
long as the character keeps its secondary meaning, and a likelihood of
public confusion would exist if another author created or used the
same or a similar character.
Unfair competition and trademark laws have been used by
courts to support protection of various aspects of fictional characters.
In one case, the name and appearance of Charlie Chaplin were found
to be protected by these doctrines.8 8 The defendant appeared in films
dressed and acting like the "Charlie Chaplin" character, but under the
name "Charlie Aplin."8 9 The court found that the defendant's purpose

82.
83.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
Spahn, supra note 78, at 342.
84.
Id. (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 23:1 (2d. ed 1984); NIMMER, supra note
27, § 2.16; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir.
1984); Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1975); Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1951);
Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 96 Cal. Rptr. 118, 123 (1971).
85.
Spahn, supra note 78, at 342.
86.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 481; see, e.g., Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650,
652 (4th Cir. 1942) (protecting "Hi, yo, Silver, away").
87.
Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
88.
Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928).
89.
Id. at 545.
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was to deceive the film-going public into believing it was paying to see
Charlie Chaplin to secure a larger audience, and enjoined the
defendant from further imitating the plaintiff. 90 In another case, a
defendant was enjoined under the law of unfair competition from
using the name of famous author Frank Merriwell, even though the
defendant did not copy any of the plaintiffs stories. 91 The court found
that the name "has become descriptive, and is closely identified in the
public mind with the work of a particular author," so that the
92
defendant's use of the name could mislead the public.
A character's name was also protected in a case where a radio
host known as "the Old Maestro" advertised the plaintiffs beer and
malt beverages. 9 3 The defendant started using the name "Old Maestro
Brew" for its own beer. 94 The court found that the radio audience
knew that the Old Maestro's radio show was sponsored by the plaintiff
and associated the defendant's use of the name "Old Maestro Brew"
with both the plaintiffs products and the radio host. 95 The court
therefore enjoined the defendant from using the name because it was
96
likely to cause confusion.
Similarly, the name "Tarzan" was protected, not only in
copyright, as mentioned above, but under trademark law, in the case
where the defendant advertised an X-rated film by the name Tarz &
Jane & Boy & Cheeta.97 The court held that by using the name the
defendant could mislead the public about the source or origin of the
film and cause the public to mistakenly think the defendant's movie
98
was authorized or produced by the plaintiff.
The appearance and costumes of characters have also been
protected under trademark and unfair competition laws. For example,
in a case where the plaintiff owned the copyrights and trademarks
relating to the characters "Superman" and "Wonder Woman," the
defendant was enjoined from using similar characters in his

90.
91.

Id. at 546.
Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, 8 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).

92.

Id.

93.
1935).

94.
95.
96.

Premier Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Conn.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 761.

97.
Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, No. 76-3612, 1976 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11754, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1976).

98.

Id.
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business. 99 The defendant operated a singing telegram company that
featured characters named "Superstud" and "Wonderwench," who
dressed in costumes similar to the original characters and carried
balloons depicting Superman and Wonder Woman. 10 0 The court found
that the public was likely to be confused as to the source and
sponsorship of the singing telegram service. 10 1 The court also found
that the defendant was benefiting from the good will created by the
10 2
plaintiffs mark.
Although trademark and unfair competition have been
effectively used to protect elements of fictional characters, there are
some disadvantages to this form of protection. In order to receive such
protection, a character must acquire "secondary meaning;" the public
must identify the character with a single source, and there must be a
likelihood of public confusion if another author were to use the same
03
or a similar character
The requirement that a character acquire "secondary meaning"
leaves new, unsuccessful, or simply less well known literary
characters unprotected.' 04 The only characters that receive protection
under trademark and unfair competition law are ones that are known
to the public and have "undergone some reasonable degree of
circulation."'10 5
For instance, the names of cartoon characters
"Ziggy"'0 6 and "Melvin the Monster"'0 7 were not protected under
trademark and unfair competition against the defendants' use of
identical names in their work. Because the characters were not well
known to the public and had almost no circulation, the public did not
associate those characters with a particular source and thus there was
little likelihood of confusion regarding the defendants' use of the
08
names.
Similarly, the rodeo character "Paladin" was not extended
protection because he was not widely known and therefore could not
have acquired secondary meaning. 09 The plaintiff, De Costa, made
99.
Ga. 1984).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119-20 (N.D.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Spahn, supranote 78, at 344.
Id.
Kurtz, supra note 80, at 443.
Pellegrino v. Am. Greetings Corp., 592 F. Supp. 459 (D.S.D. 1984).
Gantz v. Hercules Publ'g Corp., 182 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 481.
DeCosta v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 513 (1st Cir. 1975).
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public appearances at rodeos where he entertained children by
dressing up in a cowboy costume as a character named Paladin. 110 He
carried with him a business card inscribed with a chess knight and the
phrase "Have Gun Will Travel, Wire Paladin, N. Court St., Cranston,
R.I.""' He wore all black and had a St. Mary's medal affixed to his
hat."1 2 The plaintiff dressed up as "Paladin" solely to entertain
people. 113 Years after the plaintiff began appearing as "Paladin,"
defendants produced a television show that copied the "Paladin"
character, including the name, appearance, and the use of a card with
114
the phrase "Have Gun, Will Travel, Wire Paladin, San Francisco."
The court acknowledged that the defendants had copied, but found
there was no likelihood of confusion as to the source of the television
show. 1 5 The original Paladin was therefore denied relief despite the
high degree of copying. The only issue the court found relevant to its
6
analysis was that there was no likelihood of public confusion."
Even characters that are well known may not be protected if
they are associated with more than one source. In order to obtain
protection a literary character must be associated with a single
source. 117 In many cases, however, association with a single source is
a "convenient fiction" for literary characters, as they have often been
associated with their authors, 1 8 producers, 119 sponsors, 20 and even
2
with themselves.' '
For instance, the character "King Kong" was denied protection
under trademark or unfair competition because it was not associated

110.
Id. at 502.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 511.
114.
Id. at 509.
115.
Id. at 515.
116.
See id.
117.
Kurtz, supra note 80, at 442.
118.
See, e.g., Gruelle v. Molly-'Es Doll Outfitters, Inc., 94 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir.
1937); Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1934);
Fisher v. Star Co., 132 N.E. 133, 139 (N.Y. 1921).
119.
Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir.
1982); Wyatt Earp Enters. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); see also
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 485.
120.
Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 761 (D. Conn.
1935); see also Kurtz, supra note 14, at 485.
121.
DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115 (N.D. Ga.
1984); see also Kurtz, supra note 14, at 485.
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with a single source in the public mind. 122 Universal sued Nintendo
alleging that its game "Donkey Kong" infringed Universal's trademark
in the name "King Kong."'123 The rights in "King Kong" were divided
between RKO, which owned rights in the first King Kong movie, DDL,
which owned the rights in a 1976 remake, Cooper, the son of the
author, who owned rights in the book, and Universal, which obtained
its rights from Cooper. 124 The court explained that "[e]xactly what
shred of the King Kong character and name Universal owns is far
from clear," and that the "vagueness of the image in which Universal
claims a trademark right violates the fundamental purpose of
trademark: to identify the source of a product and thereby prevent
consumer confusion as to that source." 125 Therefore, the court found
that because of the extensive merchandising and "the competing
property interests in King Kong," the character "no longer signifies a
single source of origin to consumers and thus is not a valid
26
trademark."1
Similarly, in Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., the
plaintiff was the publisher of the Peter Rabbit books written and
illustrated by Beatrix Potter. 127 The plaintiff sued the defendant for
trademark infringement of the illustrations of Peter Rabbit. 128 The
defendant had used a few of the illustrations in his own book about
Peter Rabbit. The plaintiff claimed that while a number of Potter's
volumes were no longer protected by copyright, the illustrations had
acquired a secondary meaning and identified the publishing
company. 29 The court found that "it would not be enough that the
illustrations in question have come to signify Beatrix Potter as author
of the books; plaintiff must show that they have come to represent its
goodwill and reputation as Publisher of those books." 13 0 Therefore,
before a party can seek protection through trademark or unfair
protection laws, it must be sure that the character is associated with
one source and that source is the plaintiff himself.

122.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911, 923-24 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (citing Processed Plastic, 675 F.2d at 856, for the proposition that the mark must
"derive[] from a single source").
123.
Id. at 913.
124.
Id. at 914-16.
125.
Id. at 924.
126.
Id. at 923.
127.
481 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

128.

Id.

129.
130.

Id. at 1193-94.
Id. at 1195.
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Trademark and unfair competition are also unavailable as a
means of protection when there is little likelihood of public confusion
as to the source of the potentially infringing character.
Such
confusion does not require the public to be tricked into buying
something that it believes is something different.1 3 1 The public need
only believe that a single source either approved the new work, is in
some way associated or connected with the new work, or sponsored the
new work. 13 2 The public may not even "be aware of the name of the
source" as long as "they assume that products bearing the mark come
from a single, though anonymous source." 133 This aspect of public
confusion is particularly important in the movie industry, because
most people cannot identify a specific movie with a production
company, but can recognize that a single source for a character
exists.134
The King Kong case discussed above is a good example of a
case where the court held the original and potentially infringing
characters were not similar enough for the public to be confused as to
source or association. 135 The court found that even if King Kong
possessed a secondary meaning associated with Universal, there
would still remain the question of whether consumers were likely to
confuse Donkey Kong and King Kong.1 36 The court explained that
Universal must show that "there exists a likelihood that an
appreciable number of ordinary prudent purchasers will be misled, or
137
simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question."
After comparing the two characters, the court found that
Donkey Kong and his environment "create a totally different concept
and feel," and that "at best, Donkey Kong is a parody of King Kong."1 38
While King Kong "fights with dinosaurs, giant snakes, airplanes and
helicopters" and dies a "tragic and bloody death," Donkey Kong's

131.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 477.
132.
Id. (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 81 § 24:3(B) (2d ed. 1984) (likelihood of
confusion "denotes any type of confusion, including: confusion of source; confusion of
affiliation; confusion of connection; or confusion of sponsorship")).
133.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 477 (citing Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc'ns,
Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 956 (7th Cir. 1982) and 3 A. R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §19.25 (4th ed. 1983)).

134.
135.

Kurtz, supra note 14, at 477 n.263.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911, 928-29

(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
136.
Id. at 926.
137.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co.,
693 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1982)).
138.
Id. at 928.
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obstacles include "pies, cement tubs, birthday cakes, and
umbrellas.' 1 39 The video game character, Donkey Kong, was described
as "farcical," "childlike," "nonsexual," "comical," and therefore much
different then the "ferocious" King Kong who goes on "rampages,
chases people, crushes them underfoot, or throws them to the
ground."'140 The court held that even if King Kong possessed a
secondary meaning associated with Universal there was no likelihood
141
of confusion and granted the defendant summary judgment.
Trademark and unfair competition laws can offer protection of
the author's good will and give the author a say in how his character
will be used, even if the character is not sufficiently copied for a
finding of copyright infringement. 142 However, in many ways the
scope of protection offered by trademark and unfair competition laws
is far more limited than copyright protection. Whereas copyright
protection typically requires showing ownership, access, and
substantial similarity, 143 trademark and unfair competition require a
showing of secondary meaning, association with a single source, and
likelihood of public confusion. 144 As evidenced by the cases discussed
above, any of these three requirements can make it difficult to retain
control through trademark or unfair competition laws.
V. Do WE EVEN NEED A SEPARATE TEST FOR CHARACTERS?
In examining the protection available for fictional characters,
two points become clear. One is that the "distinctly delineated" and
"story being told" tests are generally unhelpful because they are vague
and offer little guidance for determining when the copyright in a
character is infringed. Second, when the tests are applied in a helpful
manner, they essentially reiterate the substantial similarity test, to be
discussed below, and do not offer anything new to the analysis.
Because the unhelpful parts are best ignored and the helpful parts are
already included in the substantial similarity test, no need exists for
separate tests for literary characters and thus no such test should be
used.
As mentioned in the introduction to this article, there is a need
for a balance between giving authors the chance to profit from and
139.

Id.

140.

Id.

141.

Id. at 928-29.

142.
143.
144.

Kurtz, supra note 14, at 495.
NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.01.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 81, §§ 15:5, 15:8, 23:1.
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control the use of their characters and the need to leave enough
creative "building blocks" in the public domain for new authors. After
reviewing the current state of copyright, trademark, and unfair
competition laws as applied to literary characters, the proper balance
would be reached if a character received protection only within the
context of the original work in which it appeared and also by
trademark and unfair competition laws. Separate protection for
literary characters would not offer authors any additional incentive to
create and would remove an excessive amount of material from the
public domain.
A. Protection within the Original Work Using the Substantial
Similarity Test
Literary characters should receive copyright protection, but
only because the substantial copying of a character may infringe the
original copyrighted work in which the character appears, not because
fictional characters deserve independent protection.
Courts have
developed a variety of tests to determine when one work is
substantially similar to another.
The first step in the analysis is to separate the ideas inherent
in the character from the expression of those ideas. As applied to
characters, this first step would involve deciding whether the
character is just a general type, i.e. an idea, or whether the character
evokes enough expression to be protectable. This analysis is precisely
what some courts have performed as part of the "distinctly delineated"
or "well developed" test.1 45 The first step, however, does not deserve a
separate name because it has always been part of the substantial
similarity test. It is a basic principle of copyright law that in order to
find copyright infringement, one must "determine whether there has
been copying of the expression of an idea rather than just the idea
itself."14 6 The determination by itself is only useful in eliminating
those characters who are so clearly a general type and not worthy of
protection that a full analysis would be a waste of time. This step
does not help us with characters that are more than a general type,
and for these more expressive characters a comparison is needed.
The two-part extrinsic/intrinsic test articulated in Krofft works
well to determine whether a character is protected by copyright within

145.
See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
146.
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the context of the original work. 147 The "extrinsic test" compares
"specific, objective criteria of two works on the basis of an analytic
dissection of the following elements of each work - plot, theme,
1' 48
dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events.
The outcome of the extrinsic test "may often be decided as a matter of
49

law."'1

The second/intrinsic part of the Krofft analysis "requires that
the trier of fact then decide 'whether there is substantial similarity in
the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute infringement.' ",150 This
"intrinsic" part asks whether the "total concept and feel" of the two
works is substantially similar. 15 1 The intrinsic test relies on the
observations of the "ordinary reasonable person."'152 The Krofft test
permits a finding of infringement only if both the extrinsic and
53
intrinsic tests are satisfied.1
The amount of protection offered to a character within the
original work in which it appears is sufficient because it is extremely
hard to completely separate a character from "trailing elements of
plot."1 54 All characters are bound by their time, place, history,
experiences, and relationships with other characters. 155 Professor
Kurtz gives the example of placing Tarzan in the city for a new
story.156 Even though Tarzan is in a completely new setting and
involved in a different story, he would not be Tarzan if "he was not
previously raised by apes," if he did not grow up in the jungle, and if
he was not good with animals. 157 Therefore, if one is to copy a
character and capture that character's persona in a substantially
similar way, it is almost impossible not to copy elements of the
original work.
If the new author included a description of Tarzan's history,
the jungle where Tarzan grew up, his relationships with the animals,
and the development of his various skills, these descriptions would
most likely be enough to constitute substantial similarity with the
147.
148.
(C.D. Cal.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 1165.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1297
1995) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.03[E][3] (quoting Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164).
Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984).
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
Metro-Goldwyn, 900 F.Supp. at 1297.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 431.

155.
156.

Id.
Id.

157.

Id.
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original work, thereby offering protection for Tarzan's character. On
the other hand, if the second author copies only the idea of a man
growing up with animals, but produces a very different character, the
intrinsic part of the test would act as a check to overprotection.
Therefore, if the city Tarzan had a vastly different "concept and feel"
about him, there would be no infringement because the application of
the intrinsic part of the test would not find substantial similarity. At
this point in the analysis, the Krofft test accomplishes precisely what
it is supposed to: it allows for protection of the expression of ideas but
not of the ideas themselves.
One possible problem occurs when the new author uses only
the name Tarzan, relying on the character's popularity to conjure in
the consumers' minds a mental image of the character. Copyright law
cannot protect a character's name and would offer no relief. Because
the public is generally familiar with the Tarzan character, the new
author would not have to include a description of Tarzan's history,
relationships, jungle origins, or special skills in order to convey
Tarzan's persona to the reader. Therefore, there may not be enough
substantial similarity of expression between the original and new use
of the character to constitute infringement. However, the name of the
character, his dress, a famous phrase the character utters, or anything
that conjures up the mental image of the character can most likely be
protected by trademark and unfair competition laws.
B. Trademark and Unfair Competition to Supplement Copyright in
Original Work
As described in the cases mentioned earlier, trademark and
unfair competition laws can protect a character's name, appearance,
and catch phrase. 158 Therefore, trademark and unfair competition
laws may offer the original author protection if a new author started
writing stories about an established character like Tarzan. But what
about the additional requirements of trademark law: the need for a
finding of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion?
If the character has not acquired secondary meaning, then it is
not eligible for trademark protection because the same concerns or
compelling reasons to offer protection are not present. When a
character does not have secondary meaning, the character is most
likely not well known and will not automatically create a mental
image in a reader's mind. Therefore, the new author would either

158.

See supratext accompanying note 86.
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have to copy the original author's expression that created the
character, in which case copyright would offer relief, or create his own
description of the character, in which case there would be no
substantial copying.
If the character is well known or has secondary meaning, the
courts are very likely to find there is likelihood of confusion. When
the "Tarzan" name was used in the title of an X-rated movie, the court
found the use likely to cause confusion as to source or origin of the
movie. 159 Furthermore, the court found that a disclaimer, which
explained that the movie was in no way associated with the plaintiff,
was not enough to prevent the confusion and ordered the defendant to
stop using the name. 160 This example makes clear both that authors
can gain substantial protection for their literary characters through
trademark, and that potential infringers will not be able to get away
with copying by simply including a disclaimer.
In fact, even
trademark seems to overprotect characters, as it is unlikely the public
would think Edgar Rice Burroughs, after writing some twenty-six
novels about Tarzan, decided to venture into the adult movie industry.
C. Protectionwithin the Original Work through the Krofft Test
Together with Trademark and Unfair Competition Laws as Applied to
the Cases
In many character infringement cases, when two works are
compared they are often described in a limited fashion, so that a full
analysis of plot, mood, setting, dialogue, and various other elements is
difficult to accomplish. For instance, in Burroughs, the defendant's Xrated film Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta was found to utilize
characters which were substantially similar to those contained in the
plaintiffs copyrighted works. 161 The court did not compare the two
works, but simply found that "characters which are distinctly
delineated in copyrighted works are protected by the copyright in
those works," and that the advertising and distribution of the
defendant's movie would infringe the plaintiffs copyright in the
62
literary works. 1
There are certain things that can be easily presumed about an
X-rated movie without the benefit of a court description or personal
159.
Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, No. 76-3612, 1976 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11754, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1976).
160.
Id at *9; see also Kurtz, supra note 14, at 481 n.282.
161.
See Burroughs, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11754, at *9-10.

162.

Id.
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familiarity, so that a comparison can be carried out despite lack of
information. The first step of the test is to determine whether the
character of Tarzan in the original work is merely a stock character, or
whether the author's overall description of Tarzan contains enough
expression for the character to be copyrightable. This standard is set
relatively low because it is meant to eliminate those characters that
are clearly of a general type. Tarzan has been the main character of
twenty-six novels, 163 in the course of which his childhood, history,
relationships, characteristics and skills have been outlined in detail.
It is, therefore, safe to assume that Tarzan is not just an idea, but is
composed of copyrightable expression.
The analysis of why Tarzan is more than just an idea is not any
better articulated than the explanation of why Tarzan is "welldeveloped," which was offered by the court in Burroughs v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer 164 and criticized earlier in this article. 165 However,
the description in Burroughs was criticized because that description
was the entirety of the test used to determine whether a character was
copyrightable. The case was used to illustrate the problem of fitting a
character into a category, either "well-developed" or "not welldeveloped," and then using this determination to find infringement. 166
In contrast, the test proposed here treats the question of whether a
character is more than an idea as only the first step in a longer
analysis, and is meant only to eliminate those characters that are
clearly of a general type. The proposed test recognizes both that the
idea/expression dichotomy is difficult to apply and cannot be the sole
basis of a test, and that it is useful in eliminating characters which
are purely ideas and therefore not protectable by copyright.
Next, the two-part, extrinsic/intrinsic test articulated in Krofft
is applied.1 67 The extrinsic test calls for a comparison of plot, theme,
1 68
dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters and sequence of events.

163.
164.

Id. at *4.
519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y 1981).

165.

See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.

166.
As noted earlier in the article, the judge in this specific case had nothing to
compare because the issue was not infringement but rather termination of a license. See
supra text accompanying note 55. The case is nonetheless illustrative of the speculation
that goes into deciding and describing when a character is well-developed so as to
underscore the point that courts should not automatically find infringement when they find
a character copyrightable.
167.
See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
168.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1297
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
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Because the movie in the Tarzan example is X-rated, it is doubtful
that the movie stays true to the plot of any of the Tarzan literary
works or attempts to follow the same sequence of events. More likely,
the movie borrows the general idea of a man rescuing a woman in the
jungle, and then adds numerous events and acts not present in the
original works. The theme and mood, considering the different
purposes and audiences of the two works, are likely different.
Further, it is fair to assume that the movie did not borrow the literary
works' dialogue in its entirety, if at all, and instead, probably
substituted its own dialogue. Similarly, while the literary works
describe in detail the beauty and wilderness of the jungle, the movie
may use this setting in a minimal way. Finally, because an X-rated
movie is not likely to focus on developing the characters, no more than
the idea of Tarzan was likely taken.
Because the extrinsic test would undoubtedly fail, there is no
need to move on to the intrinsic part of the test. However, in the event
that Tarz & Jane & Boy & Cheeta does closely follow the sequence of

events, dialogue, and theme of the literary works, and takes time to
develop the characters, the intrinsic test should be applied. The
intrinsic test calls for the trier of fact to determine whether the "total
concept and feel" of the two works is substantially similar. Again,
taking into consideration the vastly different purposes of the two
works and the non-sexual nature of the literary work, as opposed to
the highly sexualized nature of the X-rated movie, the two works
likely have a drastically different concept and feel.
Therefore, under the proposed test, the defendant's X-rated
movie would not infringe the plaintiffs copyright. However, the name
Tarzan would be protected under trademark and unfair competition
laws, and as described earlier, was in fact protected in the actual case.
The court went too far, however, when it found that the movie
infringed the plaintiffs copyright, since the defendant cannot even
remedy the problem by changing the title and character names. If the
court had used the test proposed in this article, then the defendant
would have had to change the names in the movie. However, because
the two works are not substantially similar and should not be
protected by copyright, the defendant would be able to distribute the
movie once any likelihood of confusion is removed.
The desirability of allowing the defendant to distribute his Xrated film once he was no longer infringing plaintiffs trademark may
escape some readers, but the principle of balancing between authors'
rights and the needs of the public domain must apply equally to
various kinds of works. The characters of an original work that are
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found to be distinctly delineated could just as easily be infringed by a
second work that has great artistic value. Even in the case of an Xrated movie, the defendant's creativity may offer raw material and
building blocks to others within the movie industry, as well as
enrichment of the lives of a certain segment of the public.
The proposed test would also yield better results in the
"Hopalong Cassidy" case.' 69 The court in that case found that the
character of Cassidy and a few others from the book "were sufficiently
delineated, developed and well known to the public to be
copyrightable. The use of these characters for the purposes intended
by Filmvideo therefore would constitute infringement with respect to
the above numbered films irrespective and independent of the
similarity of the story line."'170 Despite reading the books and viewing
the movies, the court could only explain the similarity in character as
the movie Cassidy being "Cassidy turned inside out."' 7 1 Other
similarities the court noted included names of characters, names of
towns, and the same general setting. 172 As previously described, the
two characters did not seem especially similar, apart from sharing a
name and a western setting. Thus, the Krofft test should be applied to
determine whether Filmvideo should have been enjoined from using
the twenty-three movies it developed.
"Hopalong Cassidy" has been described in detail in twenty-six
173
novels
and is therefore likely to be more than a simple stock
character. Since Cassidy likely encompasses protectable expression,
the next step is to apply the extrinsic test, relying on the court's
descriptions as well as the description provided by an expert witness
174
for Filmvideo.
The Court found that eleven of the movies infringed the
copyrights in the books because there was substantial similarity
between the storylines. 175 For the rest of the movies, however, the
Court did not find substantial similarity between the storylines, but
found that the use of the "Hopalong Cassidy" characters alone would
1 76
constitute copyright infringement irrespective of the plot.
169.

Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

170.
Id. at 66.
171.
Id. at 65.
172.
Id. at 63.
173.
Id. at 61.
174.
See Kurtz, supra note 14, at 459 (outlining the testimony of an expert witness
for Filmvideo regarding a description of Cassidy's character in the book as contrasted with
the Cassidy in the movie).
175.
Filmvideo, 509 F. Supp. at 65.
176.
Id.
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Therefore, for those remaining twelve movies, there is no substantial
similarity in plot, dialogue, or sequence of events, as these elements
can all be said to constitute the storyline.
The setting, theme, mood and pace of the movies and the books
are most likely sufficiently similar. The setting of both sources is the
Old West and the theme is one of action and adventure. 177 The mood
is light-hearted and both the books and movies are quickly paced.
However, the Old West and the types of locales that existed in that
time, as well as the "genre of action-adventure," are precluded from
copyright protection by the "scenes a faire" exception. 178 Included
under the "scenes a faire" exception are "incidents, characters, or
settings which are indispensable, or at least standard, in the
1 79
treatment of a given topic."'
The Ninth Circuit has held that when two works both
emphasize action and adventure, and therefore share the same
general theme, mood, and pace, then "those similarities that do exist
ar[i]se from unprotectable scenes a faire, [and] there exists no
substantial similarity of protectable expression ...."180 Likewise, in
the Cassidy case, the similarity that does exist between the original
and potentially infringing works is not similarity of protectable
expression, but rather similarity of general elements, without which
an action-adventure movie set in the Old West would not be possible.
The court in the Cassidy case also noted that the names of
some of the characters and towns were taken from the books and
included in the movies.1 8 ' The name of a town or character cannot be
protected under copyright law, 8 2 but use of a character's name is
considered one factor in determining whether the development of a
character was copied.' 8 3 "If the character's development [was] not

177.
178.

Id. at 61.
Olson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the

theme, mood and pace are all common to the genre of action-adventure television series
and movies and therefore do not demonstrate substantial similarity and citing Berkic v.
Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 1985) (denying protection to "familiar scenes
and themes [which] are among the very staples of modern American literature and
film"));Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (denying protection to
"'stock' themes commonly linked to a particular genre").
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
179.
Cir.).
Olson, 855 F.2d. at 1451, 1453.
180.
181.
Filmvideo, 509 F. Supp. at 64.
182.
37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2005) (providing that "[w]ords and short phrases such as
names, titles and slogans' are not subject to copyright .....
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 460.
183.
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copied, however, using the name is not a basis for finding copyright
'1 8 4
infringement."
The analysis thus leads us to compare the "Cassidy" described
in the books to the "Cassidy" portrayed in the movies. The book
Cassidy is described as "a foulmouthed, tobacco-spitting, violenceprone young tough, who . . . is involved in countless battles, chases,
and confrontations . . . [and] grows into a hard-bitten, middle-aged
gunman and sometimes peace officer."'1 5 The movie Cassidy avoids
alcohol, does not swear, rides on a white horse, is kind and
sentimental, and is so "sanitized from [the author's] conception of the
character that [the author] made constant complaints to the filmmakers who generally responded . . . by ignoring his diatribes and
sending him a box of cigars."'1 6 Clearly, the cleaned-up movie version
of Cassidy is not substantially similar to the rough version of Cassidy
described in the books.
As for the extrinsic elements of the two works, at least twelve
of the movies consisted of original storylines, dialogue, sequences of
events, and contained vastly different main characters. Although the
movies have a theme, pace and mood similar to those in the book,
these elements are "scenes a faire," without which any story that
employed the specific genre of the Old West adventure, whether in
book or movie form, could not be produced. Therefore, under the
extrinsic elements step of the Krofft test, the two works are not
substantially similar.
Next, under the intrinsic elements step of the Krofft test, the
jury must decide whether the book and movie version have the same
"total concept and feel." Because the court already determined that
the storylines are different, and that the theme, mood, and pace are
common to many western adventure stories, the only element that
could give the movies the same feel as the book is the characters. It is
doubtful that a jury would have recognized the "inside out" Cassidy
from the movies as the same Cassidy from the book. Also, the jury
probably would not infer that the differences in the movie version of
Cassidy are simply an expression of hidden qualities in the book
version of Cassidy that are never explicitly described. The jury is

Id.
184.
Kurtz, supra note 14, at 459 (quoting Francis M. Nevins, The Doctrine of
185.
Copyright Ambush: Limitations on the Free Use of Public Domain Derivative Works, 25 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 58, 68 (1981), describing expert witness testimony which gave a more
complete description of Cassidy as described in the book).
186.
Id. at 459-460 (citing Nevins, supra note 185, at 68).
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more likely to determine that the different storylines and characters
have created a different "total concept and feel."
Therefore, under the proposed test, at least twelve of the
movies would not be found to infringe the copyright in the book.
However, the plaintiff would be able to protect the "Hopalong Cassidy"
name under trademark and unfair competition laws. As a result, the
defendant would be forced to use different names for the main
character, but the public would still get the benefit of the twenty-three
movies. This result is more desirable than a finding of copyright
infringement, because it more closely serves the purpose of copyright
law, which is to provide the public with access to as many works as
possible, while leaving artists with enough incentive to create.
Allowing a movie that does not copy the names, storyline or characters
from another work, but instead uses only the same "scenes a faire," is
unlikely to offend artists to such an extent that they will lose all
incentive to create.
The test proposed in this paper is not easy to administer. It
requires reading, viewing or listening to both the original work and
the allegedly infringing work, which in some cases is no simple task.18 7
Furthermore, the test requires a jury to consider the two works in
order to determine if they have the same concept and feel. On the
other hand, the "distinctly delineated" and "story being told" tests are
fairly easy to administer. A judge can decide whether a character is
well-developed based on the number of works in which the character
has appeared, the popularity of the character, or a variety of other
factors that do not involve dissecting and comparing various elements
of each work or letting a jury consider the matter.
The difference between the approaches is that there is a much
lower likelihood of error with the proposed test than with either the
"distinctly delineated" test or the "story being told" test. The test
proposed in this article is composed of several steps that take into
consideration both the difficulty in determining whether two works
are substantially similar and the question of whether the alleged
infringer has copied more then just an idea. The test works well
because it allows the court to both compare various aspects of the two
works, step by step, and examine the works as a whole while
evaluating how the total work appears to the ordinary observer. The

187.
See, e.g, Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 62 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (despite reaching a decision that has since been criticized in many law review
articles, the judge in the Hopalong Cassidy case read all twenty-six novels (8363 pages)
and viewed twenty-three motion pictures (almost twenty-seven hours of viewing)).
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test may be complicated, but only because it is designed to fairly and
accurately further the purposes of copyright law.
D. Appropriate BalanceAchieved with Copyright in the Original Work
In recent years, the balance between giving new authors
enough incentive to create and leaving enough building blocks in the
public domain seems to have tilted against the public domain.1 88 This
trend of offering increasing amounts of protection for fictional
characters may have been influenced by the exceptional earning power
of fictional characters. Fictional characters are at the center of a
multibillion-dollar industry, a fact that offers strong motivation for
authors to fight to preserve their monopoly in any way they can.
For instance, Forbes reported in a list of the top ten highestearning fictional characters that Mickey Mouse made $5.8 billion in
2003.189 Winnie the Pooh, born in 1926, made $5.6 billion in 2003.190
Harry Potter, a relatively new addition to the world of famous
characters, made $2.8 billion the same year. 191 In fact, J.K. Rowling,
who was on welfare before she wrote the Harry Potter books, 92is now
the first author to qualify for a spot on Forbes's billionaire list.'
Although the earnings figures of these characters are
impressive, earnings potential is not a compelling argument under the
current copyright scheme to support recognition of independent
protection for fictional characters. After all, would J.K. Rowling forgo
writing the Harry Potter books if she knew she would "only" earn $10
million as opposed to the $147 million she earned in 2003? 193 Authors
already have enough incentive to create by virtue of their monopoly in
the original work. Because literary works must contain interesting
and real characters in order to be successful, authors would gain no
more incentive to create such characters if those characters received
independent protection. The bargain authors have struck with the
public is already more than fair. Offering characters independent
protection will not make more of the arts available to the public, but
instead will only stifle further creativity.

Kurtz, supra note 14, at 429.
188.
Vanesa Gisquet & Lacey Rose, Top Earning Fictional Characters: Top
189.
CharactersGross $25B, FORBES, Nov. 1, 2004, at 58.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Literary characters are protected within the copyright of the
original work in which they appear, but the law is less clear when a
character is separated from the original work and leads an
independent life. The two main tests articulated by courts to deal
with the phenomenon of protecting an independent character have not
been particularly helpful. The tests, which employ magic words such
as "distinctly delineated" or "story being told," are mainly used to give
a decision that has already been reached additional validity.
A better alternative is to rely on the copyright protection in the
original work, as it is generally difficult to copy a character without
copying a substantial amount of the original author's expression. The
substantial similarity test is well suited for determining when enough
has been taken from the original so as to constitute infringement.
Furthermore, trademark and unfair competition laws protect a
character that is so well known that an infringer need only mention
the character's name, without copying its expression, to be liable to
the author.
The first step of the proposed test is whether a character is a
general type, i.e. an idea, or whether the character is developed
enough to constitute protectable expression. This part of the test is
only a way of eliminating characters that are obviously a general type
with little expression so that a lengthy analysis would be unnecessary.
The second part of the test is to apply the extrinsic/intrinsic test
articulated in Krofft to determine if a character is protected by
copyright within the context of the original work. As discussed above,
protecting a character within the original work is sufficient because it
is extremely difficult to separate a character from its work. The only
gap in protection occurs when an infringer uses only the name,
phrase, dress or recognizable element that immediately brings the
character to mind, but this gap is successfully filled by trademark and
unfair competition law.
The proposed test offers an in-depth analysis that compares
various elements of two works and thereby compares the original and
allegedly infringing character.
Most importantly, however, the
proposed test does not overprotect characters because granting
fictional characters independent protection is not in accordance with
the purpose of copyright law. Doing so would limit creativity and the
dissemination of new works to the public. Authors throughout time
have borrowed from each other and used these building blocks to
create new inspiring and enriching works. Offering independent
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protection to fictional characters would limit the pool of raw material
and would do a great disservice to the public. The main concern of
copyright law is to promote the progress of the arts, not to secure an
everlasting source of revenue for the creator of a fictional character.

